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Cultural Memory and the 
Myth of the Axial Age
JAN ASSMANN
The theory of the Axial Age is the creation of philosophers and sociologists, 
not of historians and philologists on whose research the theory is based. It is 
the answer to the question for the roots of modernity. When and where did 
the modern world begin as we know and inhabit it? The historian investi­
gates the past for the sake of the past. The quest for the roots of modernity, 
however, is not interested in the past as such but only as the beginning of 
something held to be characteristic of the present. These are two categori­
cally different approaches that must be carefully kept apart, which does not 
mean, however, that there could and should not be interaction and coopera­
tion between historians and theorists or, to give the distinction a different 
turn, between specialists and generalists. On the contrary, I think this inter­
action indispensable if the theory of the Axial Age should be any more than 
just a scientific myth.
It is the quest for beginnings that gives the Axial theory or narrative a cer­
tain mythical quality; myths tend to construct beginnings, which the histo­
rian then feels summoned to deconstruct. In the Vorspiel to his Joseph novels, 
Thomas Mann deals with exactly this tension between the mythical and the 
historical approach to the past. In the perspective of the historian, the mythi­
cal beginnings tend to dissolve and to give way to ever earlier beginnings, and 
the depth of the “well of the past” proves to be unfathomable. “Tief ist der 
Brunnen der Vergangenheit. Sollten wir ihn nicht unergriindlich nennen?”1 
This opening sentence describes with inimitable precision the misgivings that 
historians, especially those who, like myself, specialize in “pre-Axial” civiliza­
tions, feel with regard to Karl Jaspers’ theory of the Axial Age. To them, Jaspers
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appears as a teller of myths, narrating about beginnings where they see slow 
developments, continuities, discontinuities, revisions, and recourses.
The myth (and to a large degree also the theory) of the Axial Age is centered 
on the following principal assumption: there is but One Truth and One Man­
kind.2 At a given point in its moral, spiritual, and intellectual evolution, 
mankind “broke through” to a much clearer apprehension of this Truth. This 
happened independently at several places at approximately the same time 
around 500 bce. In Jaspers’ rather tragic view of universal history, these Axial 
breakthroughs did not really survive their later institutionalizations—at 
least not undistortedly—when the formative phase of competing small states 
was followed by the rise of large empires; they remain a goal to be achieved, 
which gives universal history its normative perspective. If these Axial break­
throughs constitute the roots of modernity, modernity appears as an still 
unfulfilled project. Mann, in his own ways, adhered to a similar conception. 
Opposing Oswald Spengler and his theory of eight mutually nontransparent 
and untranslatable cultural spheres, he propagated the unity of the human 
spirit (“Die Einheit des Menschengeistes”)3 across cultural boundaries. In 
his Joseph novels, he not only showed how such a synthesizing view of dif­
ferent cultural traditions could work with regard to ancient Mesopotamia, 
Egypt, Israel, Greece, Christianity, but devised also a similar normative 
concept of modernity as a goal still to be achieved.4 As far as the assumption 
of the unity of humanity is concerned, Mann agreed with the Axial myth, 
but—as mentioned above—he would never have subscribed to the idea that 
all this began only in the first millennium bce. It is important to recognize 
the political and ideological context of both Mann’s and Jaspers’ concept 
of the unity of the human spirit. In the heydays of nationalism, racism, and 
other theories of human “pseudo-speciation” (E. H. Erikson)5 it was neces­
sary to formulate concepts of human intellectual unity and universal Truth— 
as it is necessary now to remember and to elaborate these concepts in order 
to overcome the “clash of civilizations” that is now being prophesied by neo- 
Spenglerian theories. In a normative perspective, the myth of the Axial Age 
has a clear function of orientation. As a reconstruction of the intellectual and 
social history of the first millennium bce, however, it is highly problematic.
In a different way, similar misgivings apply to theories of cultural evolu­
tion. Theories of evolution reconstruct history in terms of nature, as a largely 
unconscious, uncontrolled, and in this respect “blind” accumulative progress.
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As far as the history of culture is concerned, however, we are dealing also 
with processes that involve consciousness, observation, governance, control, 
reflection, choice, decision, and intervention of various kinds and to various 
degrees that do not necessarily follow any evolutionary, that is, intrinsic and 
in this respect “blind” logic. We have to account for losses, intentional breaks, 
reversions and recourses, rediscoveries, reconstructions. Nobody will deny 
that there is evolution even in culture. Evolution applies to those areas of 
culture that lie beyond conscious observation and control, especially pro­
cesses that run unnoticed and unremembered over a long stretch of time, 
such as linguistic change or innovations that become an unreflected part 
of the world in which we are living and that sink below the level of public 
awareness and discourse to the cultural unconscious. The world we are living 
in is to a large degree the result of unconscious accumulation. The innova­
tions of former times become the unquestioned and unreflected foundations 
and presuppositions of later times on which to build in order to find new so­
lutions for new problems. This process, which Pierre Bourdieu called habit- 
ualization, may well be described as cultural evolution. It concerns the dark 
side of collective memory, which lies outside the realm of conscious reflec­
tion and communication and which corresponds in many respects to Mi­
chel Polanyi’s “tacit dimension.”6 However, the paradigm of evolution loses 
in applicability if the horizon of unconscious accumulation is transcended 
and we enter the realm of conscious reflection, debate, and decision, the realm 
where the “Axial” moves take place. Evolution theory works so well with 
nature because nature knows of no conscious relationship to the past. Nature 
neither remembers nor forgets its past. Human beings, however, dispose of a 
form of memory that allows them to orient themselves in time, in memory 
back to several millennia and in expectation forward to temporal horizons of 
varying extension. This human capacity of temporal orientation invests the 
sheer historical process with meaning in various forms and steers it in various 
directions. For this reason, evolution theory, if applied to the human world, 
has to be supplemented by a specifically cultural theory that accounts for the 
dynamics of the bright, the conscious side of cultural memory.
The Axial Age is unanimously hailed as an evolutionary achievement, a 
step forward, a “breakthrough” toward the future, toward modernity. It is 
certainly not a coincidence that its first discovery happened at that other 
evolutionary moment in the intellectual history of the West that Reinhart
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Koselleck dubbed Sattelzeit (literally “saddle time”), the period between 
1750 and 1850 when the idea of “progress” began to move to the center of 
a new paradigm of historical consciousness. The Iranologist Abraham- 
Hyacinth Anquetil-Duperron (1731-1805) observed as early as 1771 the syn­
chronism between Zoroaster, Confucius, Laotse, Buddha, the prophets in 
Israel, and the Greek philosophers and spoke of “a great revolution of the 
human species.”7 For Koselleck, the Sattelzeit around 1800 marks the begin­
ning of modernity in much the same way as the Axial Age for Jaspers: the 
boundary between strangeness and familiarity. Both Jaspers’ Axial Age and 
Koselleck’s Sattelzeit meant a fundamental restructuring of our orientation 
in time and our relation to past and future. The paradigm of progress was 
linked to historicism as a new attitude toward the past, which became im­
portant in all its aspects for its own sake, and the Axial “breakthrough” was 
linked to new forms of relating to the past, of looking backward and cleav­
ing to sanctified, age-old cultural articulations. If it is a breakthrough, this 
goes in the direction of looking back, of memory, of cultural consciousness 
and discursive reflection.8 In a recent paper, Aleida Assmann criticizes what 
she calls “modernization theory” for its future-orientedness and its all too 
exclusive concentration on innovations, changes, beginnings, which neces­
sarily leads to a complete blindness as to the cultural achievements of stabi­
lization and of establishing long-term continuity and diachronic identity. In 
the framework of modernization theory (to which the theory of the Axial 
Age obviously belongs), tradition and cultural memory appear as factors of 
mere retardation, regression, and stagnation.9 In the framework of a theory 
of cultural memory, the Axial Age complex appears in a different light: as a 
phenomenon of tradition as much as of innovation. Within this method­
ological framework, the decisive question is not so much what happened in 
the Axial Age but how have these events been remembered, represented, 
and reconstructed in cultural traditions.
As far as the breakthrough to monotheism is concerned, this quintessen­
tial Axial event is represented in cultural memory as well as in the Axial Age 
narrative in terms of revolution rather than evolution. Revolution and evo­
lution are in many respects opposites. It is certainly true that revolutions do 
not occur without preparatory stages, developments, and movements lead­
ing in the direction of what is then achieved by a revolutionary transforma­
tion or “breakthrough.” Nevertheless, the process leading from state A to
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state B via a revolutionary intervention could never be adequately described 
solely in terms of evolution. As stated above, evolution is “blind,” whereas 
revolution implies observation and decision. An evolutionary process fol­
lows exclusively intrinsic vectors without exterior intervention and without 
decision between opposite options. The best example is perhaps the transi­
tion from “primary” to “secondary religions” or “polytheism” to “monothe­
ism.”10 Unless we create a specifically cultural (as opposed to biological) 
meaning of “evolution” that allows for revolution as a means of evolution, 
this change may never be described in terms of evolution alone. Monothe­
ism is not a more developed state of polytheism. Polytheism does not “lead” 
to monotheism as its ultimate state of maturity; at most, it leads to a form of 
inclusive monotheism that views the gods as immanent manifestations of 
one transcendent supreme deity. Exclusive monotheism, which does not 
recognize any gods except one, is never the outcome of evolution (as a form 
of development) but only of revolution (as a form of rejection).11
Distance, Disembedment, and Universalism: Features of Axiality
How could such an interaction between theorists and specialists be real­
ized? First of all, it would be important to come to an agreement concerning 
the characteristic traits or distinctive features of modernity, whose origins 
we are looking for in the remote past. What were the decisive innovations 
that brought about the world which we still inhabit? The first candidate, put 
forward by Jaspers, is something like general consciousness. In the Axial Age 
and in the three spheres of China, India, and the West, Jaspers claims, “man 
becomes conscious of Being as a whole, of himself and his limitations.”12 
This kind of “general consciousness” is the hallmark of philosophy, under­
stood as the art of seeing the world and human existence from a distance, a 
technique of cognitive disembedding from the symbiotic embeddedness 
of early man in the cycles of nature, political institutions, and social 
constellations.
The next two features are cognate to this one and hardly separable from 
it. The first is reflexivity, which Jaspers defines as second-order thinking, 
thinking about thinking. “Consciousness became once more conscious of 
itself, thinking became its own object” (“Das Bewufitsein machte noch ein- 
mal das Bewufitsein bewufit, das Denken richtete sich auf das Denken”).13
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The second is what Shmuel Eisenstadt calls transcendental visions. Tran­
scendental visions concern concepts with a claim to absolute, unconditioned 
Truth, with a capital “T.” These visions or conceptualizations presuppose 
new techniques of “standing back and looking beyond” (Benjamin Schwartz), 
of self-distanciation from the various conditions under which the traditional 
truths were believed and transmitted, a distance that could be achieved only 
by very few and only in the first millennium bce, which the Sinologist Ben­
jamin Schwartz, for this reason, called “the Age of Transcendence.”14 This is 
a very convincing characteristic of the intellectual transformations occur­
ring in the first millennium bce in the East and West, but is it also charac­
teristic of modernity? Are we still living in an “age of transcendence,” and if 
so, in what sense? In another context, modernity is defined by the loss of 
transcendence in the course of the nineteenth century.15 More important, 
however, is the question whether, and in what sense, we can deny the pre- 
Axial world any notions of transcendence or “transcendental visions.” Ob­
viously, only transcendence in the very strong and emphatic sense of “a 
cosmological chasm between a transcendental and a mundane sphere” 
(Hans Joas) can qualify as an exclusively “Axial” concept of transcendence. 
It is precisely this form of “two worlds theory” that is denied, for example, 
by Nietzsche’s concept of modernity. On the other hand, it applies perfectly 
well to the pre-Axial world. Even the gods of the polytheistic world are 
“transcendent” in the sense that they belong to “another” world. Transcen­
dence in the sense of other-worldliness is common to all forms of religion 
and concepts of the sacred. These gods and spirits are, however, not “extra- 
mundane.” Their “other-worldliness” does not prevent them from being 
immanent in nature. For this reason, Eric Voegelin, Talcott Parsons, Robert 
Bellah, and others have spoken of “cosmological societies” with regard to 
pre-Axial civilizations, and I try to capture this concept of cosmic imma­
nence of the divine by preferring the term “cosmotheism” to “polytheism.”16
Voegelin’s main criterion for distinguishing between pre-Axial and Axial 
civilizations (not his terminology) deserves a discussion in this context. It is 
differentiation, or, in an evolutionary perspective, the transition or turn 
from “compactness” to “differentiatedness.”17 Axiality, in this perspective, 
consists primarily in the introduction of new distinctions. My own concept 
of the “Mosaic distinction” between true and false within the realm of reli­
gion and, more generally, between god and world, is in this respect indebted
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to Voegelin’s approach. Conceptual “compactness” goes together with ana­
logical thinking. The human world is symbolically articulated on the model 
of the cosmos, and vice versa (in Voegelin’s terms: “microcosmos” and 
“macranthropos”), a style of thought that I would call “mutual modeling” and 
which obviously comes very close to Merlin Donald’s concept of “mythic 
culture.” Mutual modeling and the ensuing conceptual compactness are 
based on the “integration of society in nature” (a concept that Voegelin bor­
rows from the Egyptologist Henri Frankfort). Conceptual compactness re­
sults not so much from an inability to differentiate, a mere absence of later 
achievements, but from a will to connect and to integrate, to establish alli­
ances, equations, and identities. Also in this perspective, the Axial turn ap­
pears as a process of distanciation and disembedding, leading to or ex­
pressed in conceptual differentiation.
Distanciation or disembedding is also a quintessential trait of another 
feature, which Jaspers calls critique and which may be defined as a new 
power of negation. “Hitherto unconsciously accepted ideas, customs and 
conditions,” Jaspers writes, “were subjected to examination, questioned and 
liquidated.”18 This radical questioning of tradition led, according to Jaspers, 
to monotheism in the eastern, and to the birth of philosophy in the western 
part of the Eastern Mediterranean. Arnaldo Momigliano put this feature 
first and spoke with regard to the Axial Age of the “age of criticism.”19
It is this power of negation that turns transition into rejection (and evolu­
tion into revolution). Unlike Donald and Bellah, who conceive of the vari­
ous stages of cultural evolution in terms of addition and integration instead 
of replacement and supersession,20 Jaspers constructs the transition from A 
to B in terms of A contra B. The success of logos meant the end of mythos, 
the success of monotheism the end of polytheism (or paganism or “cos- 
motheism”). The critical, antagonistic, or iconoclastic element in monothe­
ism is unmistakable. Both philosophy (since Parmenides and Plato) and re­
ligion (since Moses or what this name stands for) imply a strong concept of 
absolute Truth, which is in fact a great innovation. This new concept of 
Truth constitutes the borderline separating what Claude Levi-Strauss called 
“la pensee sauvage” from logical and scientific thinking, and “primary,” 
culture-specific religions from “secondary” or world religions. I would in 
fact subscribe to this theory. The appearance of a new concept of absolute 
and exclusive truth in the Eastern Mediterranean world is a decisive innova­
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tion. In the paradigm of cultural memory, however, the former stages are 
neither only “integrated” in the sense of Donald’s and Bellah’s evolutionary 
theory, nor are they totally discarded and overcome in the sense of Jaspers’ 
model of intellectual progress. They are excluded, in Aleida Assmann’s ter­
minology, from the “canon” and relegated to the “archive” of cultural mem­
ory,21 from where they might be later recovered, and this rediscovery may 
then lead to another intellectual revolution such as the Renaissance with its 
flourishing of cosmotheism, magic, divination, astrology, and other seem­
ingly “pre-Axial” features.
Jaspers describes the direction of this primal turn from mythos to logos 
and polytheism to monotheism as Vergeistigung (spiritualization), which 
may be retained as a further feature of axiality. The term comes close to Max 
Weber’s concept of rationalization and disenchantment, and to Sigmund 
Freud’s concept of a progress in Geistigkeit (spirituality or intellectuality). 
The German word Geist is a notoriously difficult and untranslatable term. It 
is best understood in the sense of the Greek logos, meaning word, discourse, 
and reason. Geist has an intimate relationship to language. Vergeistigung 
means, therefore, something like Versprachlichung, transforming the world 
into discourse. It is exactly in this sense that Freud interpreted the prohibi­
tion of images as a “progress in Geistigkeit."22 The concept of Geistigkeit, 
which was so important for Freud and Jaspers, gains in significance if seen 
in the context of the assaults on Geist committed by Nazi Germany. Jaspers’ 
theory of the Axial Age with its characteristic traits of “modernity” is not 
only a self-portrait or a cultural autobiography but also a normative mirror, 
confronting modern man with an image of how he should be. As far as the 
Western part of the Axial hemisphere is concerned, the concept of Geist 
(ruach, neshamah, pneuma, logos, nous, psyche, animus, spiritus) plays in 
fact an enormous and ever-increasing role in the cultural texts of the an­
cient, especially (neo-)Platonic, Jewish, Christian, and, above all, Gnostic 
worlds.
Another Axial feature, besides general consciousness, second-order think­
ing, and critique in the name of a new concept of Truth, is the rise of great 
individuals and the discovery of individuality. The appearance of the “great 
individuals” such as, from East to West, Confucius, Lao-tse, Meng-tse, Bud­
dha, Zoroaster, the Hebrew prophets and the Greek philosophers, tragedi­
ans, and poets is in fact the most striking Axial phenomenon. This is the
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very core of the Axial myth as it was first designed by Anquetil-Duperron 
and then taken up and elaborated by Jean Pierre Abel-Remusat, Ernst von 
Lasaulx, Victor von Strauss, and many others. The great individuals are the 
few who effectuated the step back and the look beyond, this great achieve­
ment of social and ideological disembedding, this display of negational power 
and radical questioning. Inseparably linked to the discovery of individual­
ity is the stress on interiority, the rise of inner man, homo interior (Augus­
tine), ho endos anthropos (Paul), a kind of inner transcendence—the turn, in 
David Riesman’s terms, from tradition- to inner-directedness.23 This turn 
may also be interpreted as a move of disembedding and distanciation, which 
appears to be something like a common denominator of all the Axial fea­
tures enumerated so far.
The most radical form of both social disembedding and interiorization is 
what Karen Armstrong in her book The Great Transformation (which has 
been published in German under the title Die Achsenzeit)24 calls kenosis, a 
form of radical renunciation, of disembedding oneself from all social and 
other “worldly” bonds in the search for the absolute.251 do not think, how­
ever, that we should include kenosis within the Axial features. In its radical 
form, it seems specific to Indian asceticism, lacking the universality charac­
teristic of typical Axial phenomena. In its more general sense of mere altru­
ism, which Armstrong also includes in her notion of kenosis, it is, on the 
contrary, far too unspecific and applies also to non-Axial cultures.26 This 
form of renunciation is only a more efficient way of self-embedding into so­
cial or communal constellations, not a form of radical disembedding. Dis­
embedding, however, deserves to be retained as a decisive and defining fac­
tor of axiality. “The surprising feature of the axial religions,” writes Charles 
Taylor, “is that they initiate a break in all three dimensions of embedded­
ness: social order, cosmos, human good.”27
A last feature of axiality has such an importance for Jaspers that he puts it 
in the very title of his book: history. History, according to him, is the quint­
essential feature of axiality. History begins with the Axial Age in its three 
centers—China, India, Israel/Greece—and everything unrelated to one of 
these centers stays outside history, as a Naturvolk without history. History 
or historical consciousness functions in Jaspers’ theory as a leitfossil of axi­
ality. Since the Axial narrative or theory is in itself a prominent manifesta­
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tion of historical consciousness in the sense of becoming aware and render­
ing an account of one’s own past and origin, it becomes again clear in what 
sense the Axial narrative is a self-portrait and a cultural autobiography. 
Historical consciousness, however, is one of the fields where there is most 
diversity and least convergence among the “Axial” civilizations.28
This brief survey has shown that the Axial features have two common 
denominators. One is a move of distanciation or disembedding, the other 
the claim for universal validity. To these two general categories, distancia­
tion and universality, has to be added a third one, which, in the context of 
the Axial narrative, is the most decisive and in my eyes the most problem­
atic one: synchronicity. My impression is that time matters too much in the 
theoretical debates on the Axial Age. There is the danger of being caught in 
a vicious circle by including time among the features or conditions of axial- 
ity. A phenomenon qualifies as “Axial” if it occurred around 500 bce. It is 
the temporal argument that gives the Axial process the enigmatic character 
of an event, a turn, or even a mutation.
Mutation is in fact the way in which Jaspers interpreted the Axial trans­
formation. In the centuries around 500 bce, “man, as we know him today, 
came into being,” Homo sapiens axialis, so to speak. “The whole of humanity 
took a forward leap.”29 Voegelin will later speak of a “leap in being” with 
regard to the Axial event.30 The term “axis” refers to a point—the “Axial mo­
ment” as Bellah calls it—that divides the stream of time into “before” and 
“after” in the manner of the birth of Christ. Jaspers’ opposition between the 
Axial and the pre-Axial worlds appears to me in many respects as a secular­
ized version of the Christian opposition of true religion and paganism or 
historia sacra and historia profana. The biblical (both Jewish and Christian) 
concept of history implies radical changes, sharp discontinuities, a spiritual 
“mutation,” the emergence of a new man. The Axial Age narrative has the 
structure of such a mnemohistorical construction that dramatizes a ten­
dency, a development, a process of emergence in form of a revolutionary 
break, and it personifies it in the figure of a great individual.
The most problematic aspect of such a dramatization of change is the 
alienation or “estrangement” of the past.31 In the same way as Christian (and, 
for that matter, also Jewish and Islamic) orthodoxy blinded itself for the 
truths that may be contained in other religions by constructing and rejecting
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them as paganism, idolatry, or “ignorance” (jahiliya, the Muslim concept of 
paganism), Jaspers seems to be blind to truly Axial motifs in pre-Axial 
civilizations.
Little consensus has been achieved as to the agents of change. What could 
possibly bring about such a general transformation or fuel a process of 
longue duree7 Jaspers subscribed to Alfred Weber’s theory about the Reiter- 
volker, equestrian tribes or peoples, who by means of their new technology 
of horse-riding and chariot-driving were able to overrun the ancient world.32 
Such migrations, invasions, and conquests did in fact happen, but not in the 
Axial Age. The most decisive wave occurred in the first half of the second 
millennium bce, with a second wave around 1200-1100 bce. The first gave 
rise to the Hittite Empire, while the second destroyed it, and it also put an 
end to the Bronze Age in general. It is, however, more than unclear how these 
events could be related to intellectual and spiritual breakthroughs of the 
kind Alfred Weber and Jaspers are reclaiming for the Axial Age. If we look 
for something similar on the political plane taking place around 500 bce, 
we find the establishment of the Persian Empire in the West, the Maurya 
kingdoms in India, and the period of the warring kingdoms in China.
The interesting fact about the Persian Empire is that it constituted at its 
time the most extensive move of globalization in human history. This may 
have promoted the emergence of universalist ideas. By globalization I under­
stand a process of coalescence of various previously isolated zones into one 
system of interconnections and interdependencies, where everything, that 
is, all nations, empires, tribes, and states cohere in some way or other by 
political, economic, or cultural relations. Universalism, on the other hand, 
refers to the rise of theories, ideas, or beliefs with a claim to universal valid­
ity. By universalism, therefore, I understand an intellectual and spiritual 
phenomenon; by globalism, a political, economic, and civilizational process 
(implying material rather than spiritual culture).33 The two typical univer- 
salisms of Western antiquity are monotheism, both in its inclusive (“all gods 
are One”) and exclusive, biblical form (“no other gods!”) on the one hand, 
and Greek science and philosophy on the other. Since globalization is a cen­
tral aspect of modernity, we are in fact dealing here with one of its roots.
Imperialism, however, is not the only form of political globalization. In 
the ancient world, globalization started much earlier, with the emergence of 
and the contact between the superpowers of the Late Bronze Age in the sec­
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ond half of the second millennium bce.34 The transition in cultural and po­
litical outlook, orientation, or mentality to this new stage of incipient glo­
balization may most clearly be observed with respect to ancient Egypt. 
During the Old and Middle Kingdoms, that is, from 3000 until 1500 bce, 
the Egyptians quite simply identified their world with the world in general. 
Egypt is seen as a cosmos, a sphere of order, surrounded by a zone of chaos, 
inhabited by nomadic tribes whom it is important to ward off but not to 
conquer and integrate. The symbolic expression of this attitude is the same 
as in classical China, a great wall “built to fence off the nomads” (Sinuhe, 
B17).35 Only with the beginning of the New Kingdom around 1500 bce does 
the extra-Egyptian world appear as part of God’s creation. By then, the 
Egyptians have learned the lesson that their environment is not only formed 
by nomadic tribes but by empires much like their own: the Hittite Empire, 
the empire of Mitanni, the Babylonian and later also the Assyrian empires, 
the city states of Syria-Palestine, the Minoan and Mycenean states and colo­
nies, and the Nubian state of Kerma that had emerged south of Egypt. Deal­
ing with these states and empires was no longer a matter of exclusion and 
negation, but of warfare and diplomacy. Egypt had entered the “age of inter­
nationalism,” a political network that was coextensive with the world as it 
was known to and conceived of by its members. The change of political and 
mental orientation was accompanied by a rise of first universalist concepts, 
above all the idea of a creator who created the whole world in its differenti­
ated variety—including the multiplicity of languages and skin colors—whom 
the Egyptians identified with the sun. This development culminated in the 
middle of the thirteenth century bce, in a veritable religious revolution, the 
instauration of a purely and exclusively monotheistic religion by King 
Akhenaten that lasted, however, for only twenty years at most. This Egyptian 
example provides a paradigm for the connection between globalization and 
universalism, as well as for the connections between politics and, at least po­
tentially, Axial breakthroughs. We may call this form of globalization “in­
ternationalism,” which appears as the hallmark of the Late Bronze Age 
(1500-1100 bce).
In the form of imperialism, however, globalization seems to be the hall­
mark of the first millennium bce. The Assyrians started this politics of 
unification with the conquests of Tiglat-Pileser III (745-727 bce), the founder 
of the Neo-Assyrian Empire, whose successors extended its frontiers as far
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as Egypt. Forming an alliance with the Medes, the Babylonians under Na- 
bopolassar defeated the Assyrians and founded the Neo-Babylonian Em­
pire, which only ninety years later fell victim to the Persian expansion. The 
Persian Empire lasted about 300 years, until it was conquered by Alexander 
the Great. The biblical book of Daniel, composed in the year 165 bce, gives 
an account and an interpretation of this sequence of empires in the two vi­
sions recorded in chapters 2 and 7. Daniel is an apocalypsis prophesying the 
end of history and the advent of the Kingdom of God after the fall of the 
fourth empire. In its Christian reception, the fourth empire, which origi­
nally referred to Alexander’s empire (split up under his successors, the Dia- 
dochi), was identified with Rome, and because the end of history was not 
deemed really desirable, the end of Rome was deferred as far as possible in 
the form of the “Holy Roman Empire.”36 In this respect, Daniel opens a his­
torical perspective that connects the first millennium bce with Napoleon, 
who finally put an end to this construction and aspired to continue this 
tradition of imperialist globalization by building an ever greater empire. 
Daniel provided the universalist vision to the globalist project of Hellenistic 
imperialism. A similar project may have inspired Jaspers after the break­
down of Hitler’s global imperialism. It is obvious that the idea of imperialis­
tic globalization emerged in the first millennium bce and remained a major 
factor in political thought until modernity. In this respect, we may indeed 
speak of an “Axial Age.” But this is not what Jaspers had in mind, and “glo­
balization” is not his theme.
Literacy as an Agent of Change
As far as the agents of change are concerned, there might indeed exist a re­
lationship between technological and intellectual innovations on the one 
hand, and political breakdowns and intellectual breakthroughs on the other.37 
In my contribution to the volume Axial Civilizations and World History, I 
tried to shed light on the second aspect with regard to Egypt and Israel.38 
In this contribution, I want to focus on technological and intellectual inno­
vations, dealing, however, not with engineerial technologies of warfare and 
transportation but with writing as “a technology that restructures thought.”39 
I am, therefore, arguing in the field of a semiotics and pragmatics of sym­
bolic forms, which is also treated in the more theoretic contributions to this
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volume by Merlin Donald and Matthias Jung. As early as 1783, the Jewish 
philosopher Moses Mendelssohn stated that “the grammatological transfor­
mations which occurred in different periods of cultural development had an 
important impact on the revolutions of human cognition in general and 
changes in religious concepts in particular.”40 Homo axialis is the man, the 
symbol-user, who by “mutually reinforcing feedback loops between levels of 
consciousness and different modes of sign-usage” (Matthias Jung) has been 
formed by the very tools he invented.
Writing as a cultural technique may be looked at under two different as­
pects: as a technology of creation and a technology of preservation. Nobody 
will doubt that, without writing, none of the great texts that we are still 
reading today could have been preserved in such a manner that they could 
still exert their normative and formative impact, and that writing, therefore, 
has to be recognized as a necessary condition of axiality. Few, however, would 
subscribe to the idea that writing constitutes also a sufficient condition, 
which would mean that axiality is a causal consequence of writing. I myself 
would never go so far. There is, however, a third way of conceptualizing the 
relation between writing and axiality, taking axiality to be not a consequence 
but an implication of writing, an option opened up by literacy of a certain 
quality, whose acceptance, exploration, and elaboration, however, depends 
on historical and cultural circumstances. Until very recently, the invention 
or reception of writing and the development of literacy have mostly been 
studied as factors of cultural evolution. In the famous studies of Walter 
Ong, Jack Goody, Eric Havelock, and others, this has led to a kind of media- 
determinism, taking for inevitable consequences what at best are potentiali­
ties, propensities, and implications that may become real only in interaction 
with contingent political, social, and cultural factors.41
Writing is not the same in every context. We have to distinguish between 
systems and cultures of writing (this distinction will be explained later), and 
within cultures of writing between several stages of literacy. First of all, 
however, we have to consider writing as a medium not only of communica­
tion but also of memory. Under certain conditions, writing restructures 
thought not only in the direction of invention but also of retention and may 
eventually lead to a complete restructuring of what we call “cultural mem­
ory” Only writing creates the tension between “canon” and “archive” (Aleida 
Assmann) that accounts for a cultural dynamism typical of “Axial” cultures.42
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Writing is a technology that makes cultural creations possible that would 
otherwise never exist, and that preserves cultural creations in memory, 
making accessible to later recourse what would otherwise be forgotten and 
have vanished. Writing, in short, is a factor of cultural creativity and cul­
tural memory.
In order to clarify these points, I would like to start with some very gen­
eral remarks. As human beings we live in a world of symbolic articulation 
that we ourselves have created. Our world is created through communica­
tion. Aristotle’s two definitions of man, as zoon logon echon, the animal that 
has language and reason, and as zoon politikon, the animal that lives in 
communities, go together: we possess language as a function of our depen­
dency on, and capacity for, bonding, and we use language and other means 
of symbolic articulation in order to form social bonds and inhabit the world 
that we create. This space or world of symbolic articulation borders on the 
inarticulate that we bear in us as the unconscious and that surrounds our 
world from without.
It is in this space of symbolic articulation and communication that, 5,000- 
6,000 years ago, the space of writing emerged at various places on earth, in 
very different forms and on different scales, and also with different cultural 
and social consequences. By writing I understand a special kind of symbols 
that bestow visibility to the invisible, stability to the volatile, and wide dis­
semination to the locally confined. Language uses sound-symbols that are 
invisible, volatile, and locally restricted. Therefore, language is the classical 
case for the application of writing. In everyday language, by writing we un­
derstand language made visible. For other domains of the use of symbols for 
visibilization, fixation, and dissemination such as music and mathematics, 
we speak of notation and not of writing. At best, musical notation, at least in 
German, is often called writing. Notenschrift is a common term in German.
The human space of symbolic articulation and communication was with­
out doubt always occupied not only by acoustic but also by visible symbols. 
In this sense, humanity has always used writing alongside language. I am 
thinking of petroglyphs, cave paintings, pottery marks, knotted cords, and 
other markers in the space of visual communication and of cultural mem­
ory, which Donald calls “exograms.”43 There are various means to visibilize 
the invisible, stabilize the transient, and disseminate the local. It is, however, 
obvious that by writing or by the various forms of writing that developed at
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various places over 5,000 years ago we understand something different, 
something that must have changed the space of symbolical articulation 
more or less radically in proportion to its functions and range. Before going 
into details here and in order to gain a general idea of this connection be­
tween writing and change, I refer to the example of musical notation. There 
are still many traditions of music that are untouched by musical notation 
and that correspond to what in the domain of language is called orality. 
They differ mainly in two points from literate musical traditions: in stan­
dardization and evolution or innovation. “Oral” musical traditions tend to 
be less standardized and less innovative. They are more complex in their use 
of features that cannot be rendered in musical notation and in spontaneous 
improvisation, and they are less complex and innovative in the lack of po­
lyphony and in a certain formulaic repetitiveness that is characteristic also 
of “oral literature.” The kind of music, however, that develops in the space of 
writing shows a breathtaking speed and range of evolution. Eighty years lie 
between Monteverdis Poppea and Handel’s Alcina, sixty between Alcina and 
Mozart’s Figaro, and another eighty between Cosi fan tutte and Wagner’s 
Walkiire. This evolution is a matter both of creativity and of memory. Musi­
cal notation enables the composer to create music of unknown complexity 
and it establishes a memory that excludes unconscious repetition and deter­
mines the directions of development by intertextual competition. The West­
ern history of music would not have been possible without the invention of 
musical notation. This invention brought about a truly Axial turn in that it 
triggered an evolution of global significance, putting every form of music 
untouched by it in the position of “folk” or “ethnic” music comparable to 
the position of oral societies beyond the realm of “history” in Jaspers’ sense.
What we may learn from this example of the space of writing is that here 
a pressure on innovation is prevailing that is alien to the space of orality. 
There is no more eloquent testimony for this pressure than the Complaints 
of Khakheperreseneb, an ancient Egyptian author writing in the beginning 
of the second millennium bce:
Had I but unknown phrases, strange expressions,
new speech that has not yet occurred, free of repetition,
No transmitted proverbs used by the ancestors!
I quench my body of all it contains
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and relieve it from all my words.
For what has been said, is repetition 
and nothing is said that has not been said.
One cannot boast with the utterances of the ancestors 
for posterity will find out.
O that I knew what others ignore 
and what is not repetition!44
This poignant complaint refers to a problem that only the author has. The 
public expects from the bard the familiar, but from the author something 
new. The author has to position himself in a space of intertextual competi­
tion. It is through this constant pressure that the space of writing is working 
on the space of symbolic articulation, modifying but, above all, expanding 
it. Writing, far from just stabilizing the volatile and visibilizing the invisible, 
discloses entirely new areas of the inarticulate. Khakheperreseneb’s com­
plaint contains many typical Axial motifs such as reflexivity, interiority, in­
dividuality: “I quench my body.” Tradition made visible through the use of 
writing assumes an emulatory character. One even thinks of sensing an ele­
ment of “anxiety of influence” (Harold Bloom) in Khakheperreseneb’s com­
plaint. It is, therefore, not enough to state that without writing the great 
texts would never have been preserved for posterity. Without writing, they 
would never have been created, because the necessity would not have been 
felt to go beyond everything already existing in a written tradition. The bard 
embodies and performs a tradition, an author changes it by adding to it. 
This is what the Latin word auctor (from augere, to increase, grow, multiply) 
means.
These effects, however, did not immediately occur with the invention of 
writing, nor must we think of these changes in terms of evolution, that is, 
logical consequence and strict determinism. First of all, we have to distin­
guish, as has already been suggested, between systems and cultures of writ­
ing. Writing systems concern differences such as ideographic, logographic, 
syllabic, alphabetic scripts, and so on; writing cultures concern functions of 
writing and forms of its social embedding. All the major scripts that are cur­
rently in use stem from two sources: the Chinese script and the scripts of the 
ancient Near East, that is, Egyptian hieroglyphs and Sumerian cuneiform. 
Already this fact gives us an idea of the interconnectedness of cultural phe­
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nomena. India is a latecomer in this context. Its script (Devanagari) is prob­
ably a derivative of the Near Eastern alphabets. The invention of writing is 
indeed an event of Axial range, dividing the world into literate and oral so­
cieties. But it was not the invention as such that led to Axial transforma­
tions. This was the first step, and I will try to show that it was only the sec­
ond and above all the third step in the process of literacy that changed the 
world.
The first step, the invention of writing, led to what I propose to call “secto­
rial literacy.”45 In this stage, writing is used exclusively in those sectors of 
cultural activity for whose needs it had been invented. In the case of Meso­
potamia, this is economy and administration. In Egypt, too, economy or 
bookkeeping is the central function besides which, however, writing is also 
used for political representation, funerary monuments, and cultic recita­
tion. In China, writing seems to have originated in the context of divina­
tion. In Minoan and Mycenean Greece, writing (Linear A and B) never 
transcended the realm of economy (bookkeeping) and vanished with the 
end of the economic system (the palace-culture) that needed it. In Egypt, 
Mesopotamia, and China, however, the space of writing soon expanded into 
other fields of cultural practice.
The turn from “sectorial” to “cultural” literacy occurs when writing pen­
etrates into the central core of culture that we (Aleida Assmann and myself) 
call “cultural memory.” This is a question not of a system but of a culture of 
writing. What matters here is not whether we are dealing with an alphabetic 
(consonantic or vocalized) alphabet or with a syllabic, logographic, or ideo­
graphic script, and the theories especially of the Toronto School (Harold 
Innis, Marshall McLuhan, Eric Havelock, and recently Friedrich Kittler), 
which put too much stress on the Greek invention of the vocalized alphabet, 
are in my opinion mistaken on this point. What matters is whether or not 
writing is used for the composition, transmission, and circulation of “cul­
tural texts.” This is the second step toward axiality. It occurred in Mesopo­
tamia toward the end of the third millennium bce, when the sagas of the 
Gilgamesh cycle were first collected into a continuous epic, and in Egypt at 
the beginning of the second millennium bce, where the first truly literary 
texts were composed.
“Cultural memory” is that form of collective memory that enables a soci­
ety to transmit its central patterns of orientation in time, space, and divine
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and human worlds to future generations and by doing so to continue its 
identity over the sequence of generations.46 Cultural memory provides a kind 
of connective structure in both the social and temporal dimensions. It pro­
vides that kind of knowledge that enables an individual to belong, and since 
human beings need to belong, they serve their drive to belong by acquiring 
the relevant knowledge, which in German is called Bildung, in Greek pai- 
deia, in Hebrew musar, and in Egyptian sebayt. We associate with these con­
cepts institutions of reading and writing, bookcases, libraries, schools, uni­
versities, and we find it hard to imagine a kind of cultural memory that is 
not based on writing and literacy.
The contrary, however, is the case. Orality and ritual are the natural me­
dia of cultural memory, frequently accompanied with basic methods of no­
tation or prewriting such as the Australian tchurungas, the knotted cords 
(quipus) of the Incas, and similar mnemonic devices. For most of the time, 
these oral mnemotechniques were considered much more efficient than the 
early forms of writing. This is for many reasons. First, the contents of the cul­
tural memory such as the great myths about the origin of the world, the 
tribe and its central institutions, the moral norms, and similar cultural texts 
are, so to speak, “mnemophilic”; they stick in the memory because of their 
poetic form and substantial relevance. We must not forget that writing was 
invented to record the non-mnemophilic, the contingent data in economy 
and administration, which no human memory can keep for a long period of 
time. Secondly, the various cultural texts (I am using this term like Clifford 
Geertz, who described the Balinese cockfight as a cultural text) tend to be 
multimedia productions, involving (besides language) pantomime, music, 
dance, ritual and may not easily be reduced to that one stratum of symbolic 
articulation that lends itself to transcription into writing. For this reason, it 
took the Mesopotamians and Egyptians more than a millennium to take 
this step. When writing is introduced into this domain, however, there is a 
high degree of probability that it will lead to drastic transformations.
When writing enters the realm of cultural memory, there seem to be 
three options: either to transcribe the oral texts and transform them into 
literature, or to compose entirely new texts whose complexity already re­
quires writing for conceptualization and composition, or, finally, a combi­
nation of both. Mesopotamia and Israel seem to belong to the third category, 
Greece to the first, and Egypt to the second. The Homeric epics present
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themselves as transcripts of an oral performance, they exhibit their oral 
character. The same holds for Greek lyrical poetry, drama, and even the Pla­
tonic dialogues. This is not to exclude the possibility that Homer used writ­
ing for the composition of his epics. I am only stressing the fact that they 
imitate the form of oral composition and presentation. In Egypt, the situa­
tion is different. The earliest literary texts such as the “instructions” of Ptah- 
hotep, Amenemhet I, and (for) Merikare, the complaints of Ipuwer and 
Khakheperreseneb, the prophecies of Neferti, the tales of the Shipwrecked 
Sailor, Sinuhe, and the Eloquent Peasant exhibit their genuinely literary 
character in the richness of vocabulary and grammar and their structural 
complexity. In Egypt, the use of writing for the work on cultural memory 
does not lead to the transcription or textualization of oral texts but to the 
composition of new genuinely written texts, in much the same way as in 
Western music culture, where the introduction of writing led to the compo­
sition of a new kind of music, polyphony. It was only 500 years later, with 
the New Kingdom and especially in the Ramesside age (1300-1100 bce), 
that the use of writing extended to typically oral genres such as folk tales, 
love songs, harpers’ songs, and so on that, however, disappeared again from 
the space of writing after 1100 bce.
With the literarization of significant parts of cultural memory and the 
production of cultural texts that are conceptually literate (requiring writing 
already for composition and addressing a reader), a writing culture changes 
from sectorial to cultural literacy. Only at this point the techniques of writ­
ing and reading affect the connective structure of a society. One of the typi­
cal effects of this transformation is the construction of a glorious, heroic, or 
classical past or “antiquity.” The cultural memory becomes two-storied, di­
vided into the new and the old, modernity and antiquity. An important fac­
tor in this development is linguistic change. The older texts within the liter­
ary tradition, which now become validated as “classics,” preserve a linguistic 
stage that no longer corresponds to the spoken language of the present. At a 
certain time, this distance between the “classical” and the vernacular idiom 
grows so wide that the classical language has to be learned specifically; we 
are dealing with cultural diglossia. This situation is typical of Mesopotamia 
as early as the third millennium, where Sumerians and Akkadians lived to­
gether speaking two completely different languages, and where Sumerian 
stayed in use for liturgic purposes until the age of Hellenism. With respect
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to the restricted use of Sumerian in this culture, we may speak of sectorial 
diglossia, which is a very widespread phenomenon. Cultural diglossia, on the 
other hand, is reached where and when the other language characterizes the 
cultural texts, those texts that carry the normative and formative knowledge, 
which constitutes and transmits a cultural identity across the sequence of 
generations and forms the diachronic backbone or connective structure of a 
society. This stage of cultural evolution characterizes the Cassite age in Meso­
potamia (1550-1150 bce) and the Ramesside age in Egypt (1300-1100 bce).
The construction of a classical, heroic, or “golden” age, an “antiquity” as a 
past to look back at for models of behavior and literary production, means a 
first step in the direction of canonization. This cultural split into antiquity 
and modernity seems to me one of the characteristic prerequisites if not ele­
ments of axiality. It introduces into a given culture an element of critical 
distance and reflexivity. Canonization, at this first stage, means the collec­
tion of cultural texts of the past to form an obligatory syllabus of cultural 
knowledge, to be learned by heart and to be referred to as authoritative in 
critical discussions and situations. An Egyptian wisdom text of the thir­
teenth century bce gives a list of eight “classics” of the past, whose models 
the pupil should follow in his strive for immortality. These authors achieved 
immortality, not by building pyramids but by writing books that are still 
read, learned, and quoted because of their ever valid truth and authority:
Is there anyone among us like Hordjedef?
Or someone like Imhotep?
Among our contemporaries, there is none like Neferti 
or Kheti, the greatest of them all.
I mention to you only the names of Ptahemdjehuti and 
Khakheperreseneb.
Is there another Ptahhotep 
or somebody like Kairsu?47
A German-Egyptian team discovered some years ago a tomb chapel in As- 
siut in the northern part of Upper Egypt that was reused during the New 
Kingdom for what seems to be a chapel of cultural memory. Some learned 
scribes had covered free spaces on the walls with large sections from classi­
cal texts of the Egyptian literary tradition containing two versions of the
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instruction of King Amenemhet I, the Instruction of Dua-Kheti, and the 
Hymn to the Nile, all three believed to be works of Kheti, “the greatest of 
them all,” as well as two versions of the Loyalist Instruction by Kairsu, the 
Teaching of a Man for his Son, and the Prophecies ofNeferti,48 thus six works 
of the classical tradition whose superior rank and high esteem as cultural 
texts is also documented by dozens or even hundreds of ostraca, limestone 
flakes that were used in school. The Egyptian scribe learned the craft by 
learning by heart the classical texts and by writing them down in appropri­
ate portions using potsherds and limestone flakes as material. Another col­
lection of Egyptian classics of the past can be found on a wall in a tomb at 
Saqqara dating from the thirteenth century bce.49 The two lower registers, 
the only ones to have survived, list thirteen names apiece, the upper con­
taining names of viziers and high priests of Ptah, the lower those of priests 
of slightly inferior rank, while the two sections are divided by a horizontal 
line that contains other names. Of these, four names reappear from the Pa­
pyrus Chester Beatty: Kairsu, Imhotep, Khakheperreseneb, and Kheti. The 
fifth is Ipuwer, the “author” of the Admonitions oflpuwer, whose appearance 
confirms that lamentations and chaos descriptions (the genre to which be­
long also the works by Neferti and Khakheperreseneb) were also considered 
cultural texts of highest rank. Apart from these “authors,” the list spans 
notables from the Old to the New Kingdom. The only name among these 
classics that is still unknown to us is Ptahemdjehuti. Hordjedef, Neferti, 
Kheti, Khakheperreseneb, Ptahhotep, Kairsu, and Ipuwer are known by 
their texts; Imhotep is known by a wealth of data, and his lost instruction is 
often referred to.
I think that the Egyptian case may be generalized. At a certain stage, ev­
ery literate culture enters the stage of a split culture, divided into the old and 
the new, and it is writing in the form of cultural literacy that brings this split 
about. Since this split is dependent on linguistic change and finds its typical 
expression in the distinction between classical and vernacular language, 
and since linguistic change is a largely unconscious and uncontrolled pro­
cess, we may even speak of evolution. The cultural and social consequences 
of this split, however, depend on cultural decisions and institutions.
Even the typically Egyptian association of this split with the idea of im­
mortality may, at least to a certain degree, be generalized. In its literate, 
written form, cultural memory appears as a timeless or at least imperishable
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space of immortality, which one may enter by creating a book or work of art 
of everlasting beauty, truth, or significance. This idea of literary or artistic 
immortality may be considered as a first step in the direction of transcen­
dence or transcendental visions (Eisenstadt). The use of writing for the ful­
fillment of the desire to transcend one’s life span and to live on in the mem­
ory of posterity dates back, in Egypt, to the very beginnings of literate 
culture, but I would classify this use of writing for tomb inscriptions as 
sectorial literacy. The step toward cultural literacy is achieved when the 
tomb monument is topped by the literary work, for example in the words of 
Horace, who said with regard to his book of odes: “exegi monumentum aere 
perennius / regalique situ pyramidum altius.” This motif appears already in 
the same Egyptian text that contains the canon of classical authors:
They [the sages of the past] have not created for themselves 
pyramids of ore 
nor stelae of iron;
they have not contrived to leave heirs in the form of children, 
to keep their names alive.
But they created themselves books as heirs 
and teachings that they have written.
They employed the scroll as lector priest 
and the slate as “loving son.”
Teachings are their pyramids, 
the reed their son,
the polished stone surface their wife.
Their tomb chapels are forgotten,
but their names are recalled on their writings, that they have 
created,
as they endure by virtue of their perfection.
Their creators are remembered in eternity.50
We are not yet dealing here with “real” axiality, because this step of canon­
ization is still culture-specific and lacks the global claims typical of Axial 
movements. But it is a step in the direction of axiality, and it is a step within 
the space of writing.
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Another sphere of cultural memory that is strongly affected by the use of 
writing is history. The existence of written sources about the past makes it 
possible to draw the distinction not only between the old and the new, but 
also between myth and history. The use of written records creates history in 
the sense of a critical discourse, separating mythical tales about the past 
from reasoned accounts of documented history. This step seems to be a 
Greek achievement, but the Greeks themselves attributed it to the Egyp­
tians, opposing their own mythical form of historical consciousness to Egyp­
tian history, which is based on written records. Typical examples of this in- 
tercultural comparison are Herodotus’ account of the visit of Hecataeus of 
Miletus with the priests of Amun at Thebes51 and Plato’s account of Solon’s 
visit with the priests at Sais.52 Both Hecataeus and Solon confront the Egyp­
tian priests with Greek traditions about the past. Hecataeus recites his own 
genealogy, which leads after fifteen generations to a god as the ancestor of 
the family, and Solon tells the Greek version of the story of the flood, the 
myth about Deukalion and Pyrrha. Both are then confronted by the Egyp­
tians with their records. Hecataeus is led into the temple where he is shown 
341 statues of high priests, one the son of the other and no god interfering, 
documenting 11,340 years of purely human history. Solon is shown the 
Egyptian annals stretching back over more than 9,000 years, where the 
memory of Athens’ glorious past is preserved, for example their victory over 
Atlantis, which in Greece itself is destroyed and forgotten. All this is, of 
course, pure fabulation, but it illustrates the principle of critical history with 
its distinction between myth and history, brought about by the use of writ­
ing for chronological bookkeeping, which, in the form of annals and king- 
lists, belonged to the first and most important applications of writing in 
Egypt and Mesopotamia. In this sense of documented past and critical veri­
fiability, it is writing that produced history and dispelled mythology. Writ­
ing caused history to be where myth was, because it documented conditions 
in which not gods but human kings reigned and in which humans were re­
sponsible for their actions. Writing bestows to historical memory the qual­
ity of verifiability and adds a truth value to its accounts about the past that 
myth, in spite of its truth claims, is lacking.
A third domain of cultural memory where the use of writing leads to dra­
matic changes is religion. It is here that the second and decisive step toward
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canonization is achieved, a step of truly global significance, which in my 
opinion forms the very center of Jaspers’ concept of the Axial Age. In the 
realm of religion, writing appears with the same critical pathos as in the 
sphere of history, opposing its superior truth to the invalidated truth claims 
of myth. Here, its claims to superior truth are based on revelation, which it 
codifies. All world religions—Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Jain­
ism, the religion of the Sikh, Confucianism, Daoism—are founded on a 
canon of sacred scripture that codifies the will of their founder and the su­
perior truth of his revelation. This step of canonization was invented only 
twice in the world: with the Hebrew canon and the Buddhist canon. All later 
canons followed these examples. This second step of canonization changed 
the world in a truly “Axial” way.
The first step of canonization, which we encountered in Egypt and Meso­
potamia, was connected with a cultural split into antiquity and modernity, 
drawing a distinction within the culture. Canonization here means the se­
lection of the timelessly authoritative and exemplary texts from the plethora 
of written literature. The second canonization applies a different criterion: 
the criterion of absolute and universal truth, drawing a distinction that sets 
one’s own culture or religion off against all other religions (including one’s 
own past), which become now excluded as paganism, idolatry, heresy, and 
error. Some of this pathos of distinction and exclusion seems to me still 
present in Jaspers’ concept of the Axial Age, which in this respect appears as 
a secularized version of the religious distinction between paganism and true 
religion. His idea of Axial civilizations puts the pre- and extra-Axial world 
in a position similar to the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic construction of 
paganism. This aspect becomes even stronger with Schwartz’s definition 
of the Axial Age as the “age of transcendence” and Eisenstadt’s concept of 
“transcendental visions” as the hallmark of axiality. All this is to a large de­
gree a feat of cultural memory and an effect of writing and canonization. 
We don’t know anything about the transcendental visions of shamans, kings, 
priests, and seers unless they become not only written down but, above all, 
are received into a canon of sacred scripture. It is only then that they be­
come part of cultural memory and religious identity.
If primary canonization may be partly explained in terms of evolution 
dependent, as we have seen, on the truly evolutionary process of linguistic 
change, secondary canonization is by no means an evolutionary achieve­
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ment but a matter of conscious revolution, which in individual life could be 
compared to a conversion. The distinction between evolutionary processes 
and other forms of change implying conscious interventions and decisions 
between alternative options seems to me highly important in the study of 
the Axial Age.
In the West, the Hebrew canon of sacred scripture is complemented by a 
Greek and Latin canon of classical literature. The cultural memory of the 
West rests on these two projects of canonization, which were conducted 
roughly simultaneously—and probably not independently—by specialists 
in Palestine and Alexandria. The distinctive hallmark of what I call second­
ary canonization is the rise of exegesis. In the stage of primary canoniza­
tion, the texts selected as classics exist in a form that the medievalist Paul 
Zumthor called mouvance.53 The texts were constantly reformulated, ampli­
fied, or substituted by other texts in order to accommodate them to the 
changing conditions of understanding. Their “surface structure” was sacri­
ficed in order to save at least part of their meaning. This is why even written 
texts tend to exist over a longer stretch of time in many different versions. 
The continuous growth of the book of Isaiah, first into Deutero- then into 
Trito-Isaiah, is a typical case of how a cultural text is changing in what the 
Assyriologist Leo Oppenheim called “the stream of tradition.”54 The Epic of 
Gilgamesh developed in the course of its transmission and redaction from a 
cycle of sagas into the “twelve-tablets-composition” in which it appears in 
the Neo-Assyrian library of Assurbanipal at Niniveh. In a similar way, the 
Egyptian Book of the Dead developed from a pool of unconnected spells out 
of which every individual funerary papyrus picked its own specific selection 
into a real book with a fixed selection of 167 spells in a fixed order. Written 
texts, in this “stream of tradition,” share to a certain degree the sort of oral 
texts that are not fixed but subject to much variation over the course of time.
This flexibility or mouvance is categorically stopped and excluded by 
the process of secondary canonization.55 Secondary canonization means the 
combination of a sacralization of surface structure typical of sacred texts 
like hymns, incantations, and ritual spells on the one hand, and the preser­
vation of meaning typical of cultural texts in the state of mouvance as the 
constant adaptation of the text to changing conditions of understanding on 
the other. Sacred texts are not necessarily cultural texts, since they may be 
known only to specialists and withheld from public circulation. Sacred texts
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are verbal enshrinements of the holy. In sacred texts, not a syllable must be 
changed in order to ensure the “magical” power of the words to “presentify” 
the divine. In this context, not “understanding” matters but correctness of 
pronunciation, ritual purity of the speaker, and other requirements con­
cerning proper circumstances of performance. As the case of the Rgveda 
shows, this principle of non-mouvance and verbatim fixation applies to sa­
cred texts independently of their oral or literate form of transmission.56 Sa­
cred texts, therefore, are exempt from the pressure to adapt to the herme­
neutical conditions of a changing world.
In the process of secondary canonization, the principle of sacred fixation 
is applied to cultural texts. On the one hand, they are treated like verbal 
temples enshrining divine presence, but on the other they require under­
standing and application in order to exert their formative and normative 
impulses and demands. The solution to this problem is exegesis. Exegesis or 
hermeneutics is the successor of mouvance. In the mouvance stage of literate 
transmission, the commentary is being worked into the fabric of the text. 
This method has been shown by Michael Fishbane to be typical of the bibli­
cal texts in their formative phase.57 They are full of glosses, pieces of com­
mentary that later redactors have added to the received text. Only with the 
closure of the canon is this process stopped, and exegesis has now to take the 
form of a commentary that stays outside the text itself.58
This distinction between text and commentary typical of secondary can­
onization applies not only to the sacred but also to the classical canon. In 
this respect, the Alexandrinian philologoi seem to have led the way. They 
introduced into their collection of ancient writings the distinction between 
hoi prattomenoi (literally “those to be treated”, that is, the classical texts 
worthy of exegetical treatment, of a commentary) and the rest.59 The Latin 
author Aulus Gellius compared this textual elite to the highest class of Ro­
man taxpayers called “classici.” In the Jewish tradition, this split into and 
relationship between text and commentary typical of secondary canoniza­
tion finds its earliest expression in the concept of written and oral Torah 
(torah she be’al khitav and to rah she be'al pe). Here, commentary has to be 
oral in order not to violate the space of writing, which is exclusively reserved 
for and occupied by sacred scripture. The oral Torah is a collection of oral 
debates and commentaries on the written Torah that became itself codified
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in the Talmudic and Midrashic traditions. It is believed to go back via an 
unbroken chain of reception (shalshelet ha-qabbalah) to Moses himself.
The oral exegesis of a sacred text accompanying its public recitation seems 
indeed to correspond to Jewish custom dating back to the beginnings of 
canonization. The book of Nehemiah reports a public reading of the Torah, 
where Ezra read the text and several of the Levites gave a commentary:
And Ezra opened the book in the sight of all the people, for he was 
above all the people, and as he opened it all the people stood. And Ezra 
blessed the lord, the great God, and all the people answered, “Amen, 
Amen,” lifting up their hands. And they bowed their heads and wor­
shiped the lord with their faces to the ground.
Also Jeshua, Bani, Sherebiah, Jamin, Akkub, Shabbethai, Hodiah, 
Maaseiah, Kelita, Azariah, Jozabad, Hanan, Pelaiah, the Levites, helped 
the people to understand the Law, while the people remained in their 
places. They read from the book, from the Law of God, clearly, and they 
gave the sense, so that the people understood the reading. (Neh. 8:5-8)
Some centuries later, the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus testifies to the 
same custom, where he confronts Jewish and Greek religion:
Can any government be more holy than this? or any Religion better 
adapted to the nature of the Deity? Where, in any place but in this, are 
the whole People, by the special diligence of the Priests, to whom the 
care of public instruction is committed, accurately taught the princi­
ples of true piety? So that the body-politic seems, as it were, one great 
Assembly, constantly kept together, for the celebration of some sacred 
Mysteries. For those things which the Gentiles keep up for a few days 
only, that is, during those solemnities they call Mysteries and Initia­
tions, we, with vast delight, and a plenitude of knowledge, which ad­
mits of no error, fully enjoy, and perpetually contemplate through the 
whole course of our lives.60
It is obvious that Josephus, in this polemical passage, does not do full justice 
to the Greek organization of cultural memory. He ignores the classical
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canon, the traditions of scientific discourse, and the various forms of exege­
sis practiced in the schools of philosophy, medicine, and other branches of 
knowledge. He focuses only on religion and confronts the Jewish institu­
tions of religious instruction and the Greek mystery cults. Arbitrary and 
highly selective as this comparison may be, it illustrates a very important 
distinction: the distinction between ritual and textual continuity.61
In spite of their extensive use of writing, Egyptian and other “pagan” reli­
gions were still relying on ritual continuity. In the world of ritual continuity, 
the public has indeed to wait for the next performance in order to get access 
to the sacred texts of cultural memory. Textual continuity is only achieved 
when institutions of learning and exegesis are established that keep the an­
cient texts constantly present and semantically transparent. The transition 
from ritual to textual continuity means a complete reorganization of cultural 
memory in the same way that the transition from the ethnically and cultur­
ally determined religions of the ancient world to the new type of transcul- 
tural and transnational world religions meant a totally new construction of 
identity. The canon, in a way, functioned as a new transethnical homeland 
and as a new transcultural instrument of formation and education.
There seems to exist a strong alliance among revelation, transcendence, 
and secondary canonization. The codification of revelation leads to a expa­
triation of the holy from the worldly immanence into transcendence and 
into scripture. The pagan or pre-Axial cult religions presuppose the imma­
nence of the holy in images, trees, mountains, springs, rivers, heavenly bod­
ies, animals, human beings, and stones. All this is denounced as idolatry 
by the new scripture-based world religions. Scripture requires a total re­
orientation of religious attention that was formerly directed toward the 
forms of divine immanence and is now directed toward scripture and its 
exegesis. Secondary canonization means an exodus both of the holy and of 
religious attention from the cosmos into scripture. To the extramundane 
nature of God corresponds the textual character of his revelation. To be 
sure, these remarks concern only the sacred canon such as the Tanakh, the 
Christian Bible, and the Qur’an, and not the canon of Greek and Latin clas­
sics. The structure of the classical canon is different in that it is open and 
allows for constant modifications around an unquestionable core, whereas 
the sacred canon is closed. This distinction between closed and open canons 
applies, however, only to the West. Eastern, especially Buddhist, canons
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have a different, less strict structure. Common to all corpora of secondary 
canonization is the existence of a full-fledged culture of exegesis and the 
strict distinction between text and commentary.
Seen as an agent of change, we may ask to which aspect of axiality literacy 
at the stage of secondary canonization makes the most decisive contribu­
tion. In my opinion, this is precisely the aspect of axiality that has been 
shown to function as a common denominator of most of the Axial features 
discussed above: distanciation and disembedding. Writing is a technology 
that restructures not only thought but also, under certain cultural circum­
stances, the whole network of relations between human beings, man and 
society, man and cosmos, man and god, and god and cosmos. The meaning 
of distanciation and disembedment as “Axial” moves, however, can only be 
properly understood if we get a better understanding of what embedment 
and integration mean.
In the evolutionary framework of the Axial narrative, embeddedness ap­
pears as the “not-yet” of the Axial achievement of distanciation and disem­
bedding. What disappears in this perspective is the positive aspect of embed­
ding. Embedding man in a social, political, and conceptual or ideological 
network of meaning and coherence and embedding the divine in a cosmic 
network whose meaning and coherence is modeled on the same basic ideas of 
order, truth, and harmony, should be recognized in its own right as a major 
civilizational achievement. There is perhaps no society on earth that went so 
far as the ancient Egyptians in articulating, elaborating, and also institution­
alizing their vision of sociocosmic coherence, which they called Ma’at. There 
is no reason not to call this conceptualization a “transcendental vision.” We 
cannot point to a “great individual” to have first formulated it, since no insti­
tutionalization of this first “vision” has been preserved, but the Egyptians 
themselves would have pointed to Imhotep, the first of their celebrated sages, 
who worked as a vizier under King Djoser (2750 bce) and was divinized for 
his great invention, the art of building in stone, and the erection of the first 
Pyramid, the step pyramid at Saqqara. His often-mentioned “instruction” is 
lost to us, but the transcendental character of the idea of Ma’at is obvious. 
Ma’at is what Kant would have called a “regulative idea.”
Ma’at, however, works in the opposite direction of distanciation and dis­
embedment. It is the very principle of embedment, of creating connectivity 
in the social, temporal, and cosmic dimensions, establishing social bonds
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between humans and temporal connections between yesterday, today, and 
tomorrow ensuring memory, success, stability, and even immortality. Who 
lives in and by Ma’at, this is the great Egyptian promise, will not perish but 
pass through the test of the judgment after death to eternal life in the Ely- 
sian fields.62 However, even this concept implies an element of distanciation, 
which is self-distanciation, renunciation from an immediate fulfillment of 
one’s drives and impulses. The ideals of self-control, discretion, modesty, 
altruism, beneficence, openness to the needs of others, pity, compassion, 
empathy are at the core of the Egyptian concept of virtue. Knowing how to 
listen well is deemed more important than knowing how to speak well. This 
form of self-distanciation is the prerequisite for self-integration. It may also 
be described as a way of standing back and looking beyond: standing back 
from one’s own narrow sphere of interests and looking beyond at the whole 
or at least a larger horizon of community. It is certainly not a mere coinci­
dence that the hero of Egyptian wisdom was both a vizier and an architect. 
Knowing how to build a pyramid and knowing how to build a state and a 
society require comparable qualities. Certainly, this is not the kind of state 
and society we would very probably like to live in, and “Egyptian man,” able 
to perfectly integrate him/herself into this pyramidal sociopolitical edifice is 
not man as we know or want him today, at least after the breakdown of the 
socialist totalitarianism, but even this construction of reality was illumined 
by transcendental visions, otherwise it would not have persisted for three 
millennia and more. It was certainly not the “house of slavery” as it is de­
bunked in the Bible.63 What the Egyptian example may teach us is that even 
the pre-Axial world is the result of positive achievements and that the Axial 
breakthrough is not just the result of discoveries of what was unknown be­
fore, but also the result of conscious acts of rejection, abolition, rebellion 
that cannot be accounted for in an evolutionary perspective.
By adopting Christianity, the Egyptians themselves were able to perform 
a change in the most radical way. From champions of integration they 
turned into champions of isolation. To the ancient Egyptian mind, nothing 
could perhaps appear more absurd than total self-disembedding, since so­
cial embeddedness was identified with life, virtue, and morality. Seth, the 
god of evil and brutal violence, is the typical solitary one, and everyone flee­
ing from social life would be associated with Seth and considered as evil.64 
After converting to Christianity, however, the Egyptians became virtuosos
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of solitude and went to unprecedented extremes in their search for isolation 
and renunciation. The Egyptian saint Anthony became the patron of Chris­
tian hermits, the Egyptian monasteries with their rules as codified by Pa- 
chom and Schenute became the models for Christian monasticism. The 
Egyptians adopted the Christian idea of the Kingdom of God as a goal of 
integration and reembedment with the same passion and perfection as pre­
viously the kingdom of Pharaoh, who was believed to be a god on earth and 
the son of the highest god.
To the disembedding of man from society and the world corresponds the 
disembedding of God from cosmic immanence and a pantheon of co-deities. 
These two movements of disembedding, that is, monotheism and the birth of 
individualism, have always been seen in strong connection. The connection 
becomes only the more obvious if one realizes that it is toward God that the 
hermit and toward man that God turns. The hermit abandons human society 
in order to draw nearer to God, and God, one could say, renounces divine 
companionship in favor of the “covenant” he establishes with his chosen 
people. In the early stages of biblical monotheism, the texts lay great stress 
on God’s “jealousy” and compare the covenant between God and his people, 
God and man, to the erotic, sexual, and matrimonial bonds between man 
(God) and wife or bride (Israel). God can by no means be alone; what he ab­
hors most and what puts him into fits of fury and jealousy is to be abandoned 
by his people. Man, in turn, leaves society not out of misanthropy but for the 
love of God. Both forms of solitariness, God’s and man’s, are not absolute but 
rest on a new form of partnership. In the frame of this partnership, man 
grows individualistic and God grows monotheistic.
It is fascinating to see how important a role writing, literacy, and scrip­
ture play even in this connection. With monotheism, the case is obvious. No 
monotheistic religion, in fact no “secondary” (i.e., founded) religion can do 
without a canon of sacred scripture. The solitude of God is, one could say, 
scripture-based. Similar statements apply to the solitude of man. Generally 
speaking, there can be a solitary reader but no solitary listener. Writing and 
reading create the possibility of communication without interaction. To 
scripture, however, this concept of interaction-free communication applies 
in a much more poignant sense. Studying the Torah and learning it by heart 
is the first and foremost requirement of man in the frame of monotheistic 
religion. Scripture, that is, the Torah, is the only mediator between the two
398 REEVALUATIONS
solitary partners, God and man. Ger anokhi ba-’aretz (“I am a stranger 
on earth”) the psalmist says in Psalm 119:19, adding: al-taster mimmeni 
mitswoteykha (“do not conceal thy commandments from me”). We see that 
also man’s solitude, his alienation on earth, is scripture-based. God’s com­
mandments, which are codified in the Torah, offer him a home that he is 
missing “on earth.” This home is what Heine called “ein portatives Vater- 
land” and what Bellah calls “a portable religion.”
Conclusion
As a result of these considerations concerning literacy as an agent of change 
in the structure and organization of cultural memory, I have to confess that 
I cannot bring myself to really believe in the “Axial Age” as a global turn in 
universal history occurring grosso modo in the middle of the first millen­
nium bce. On the other hand, I find the concept of axiality (with pre- and 
post-axiality) a valuable and even indispensable analytic tool in the com­
parative study of cultures. In my view, the stress on the alleged and in sev­
eral cases undeniable synchronicity of Axial moves has led to an unneces­
sary mystification of the historical evidence.65 These “breakthroughs” 
occurred in different civilizations at different times and to different degrees 
under different conditions and with different consequences. The undue fas­
cination with time and simultaneity is the congenital defect of the Axial Age 
theory, lending it the character of a myth rather than a theory. We should 
give up the idea of synchronicity and, along with it, the tendency to describe 
the transition from pre-Axial to Axial to post-Axial stages exclusively in 
terms of evolution. There is, in my view, no evolutionary logic that leads 
from pre-Axial to Axial societies. Axiality implies always a revolutionary 
break, a “vertical” intervention of the spirit into the “horizontal” line of 
natural and cultural evolution.
As far as the “great individuals” are concerned, their appearance in re­
corded history stretches over several millennia. Akhenaten, who has every 
right to be included in this number, lived as early as the fourteenth century 
bce, Moses, if he ever lived, must equally belong to the second millennium 
bce, to which also Zoroaster is now dated by most scholars, whereas there is 
no reason why Jesus and Mohammad, who came much later, should be ex-
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eluded. Had his writings been preserved or his visions been institutionalized, 
we should even include Imhotep, who lived in the twenty-eighth century 
bce. The decisive event is not the terrestrial existence of the great individu­
als but the canonization of their writings. The real “Axial Age” is not the age 
of the great individuals such as Akhenaten, Zoroaster, Moses, Homer, Isa­
iah, Plato, Confucius, Buddha, and so on, who did not wait until 800 bce to 
appear and who did not disappear by 200 bce, but the age of secondary 
canonization. Canonization, as we have seen, is not an individual but a so­
cial and collective process. Canonization is the achievement of a society that 
decides to invest these texts with the highest values, to hold them in the 
greatest authority, to make them the basis of its life, or to follow their model 
in artistic creation. There were presumably always great individuals with 
“transcendental visions.” Decisive is the step to turn these visions into “cul­
tural texts,” to select these texts into a canon and to frame the transmission 
of this canon by institutions of exegesis ensuring its availability, readability, 
and authority over 3,000 years.
If we insist on a first period of axialization, we could point to the years 
about 200 bce to 200 ce when the great canons were established: the Confu- 
cian, the Daoist, and the Buddhist canons in the East, and the Avesta, the 
Hebrew Bible and the canon of Greek “classics” in the West. This is not the 
time when Homo sapiens axialis, “the human being with whom we are still 
living,” came into being, but when the texts were canonized that we are still 
reading. The Axial Age is nothing else but the formative phase of the textual 
continuity that is still prevailing in our Western and Eastern civilizations.
If we have to give up the concept of an Axial “age” in the sense of a con­
crete time period in universal history, this does not mean that we have to give 
up the adjective “Axial” as well. “Axial,” it is true, has strong temporal con­
notations. The axis around which history is believed to revolve, dividing this 
history into before and after, is a point or period in time. What we have to 
give up is the universality of this axis and this history. Different civilizations 
have different turning points in their history. That these turning points coin­
cide temporally may be due to contact or to structural analogies. By no means, 
however, should this coincidence be promoted to a major factor in the inter­
pretation of the turning point in question. Having occurred around 500 bce 
is not per se a feature of axiality. Neither have we to look for the roots of
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modernity exclusively in this period. It is our cultural memory that reaches 
back to Homer and Isaiah, but not the emergence of our modern world.
With regard to the ancient world, we are dealing neither with a mutation 
nor with a “blind” evolution, but with cultural processes stretching over 
several millennia, implying various historical factors and agents, and im­
plying even reversibility, backward movements of “de-axialization,” as has 
been rightly stressed by Eisenstadt on various occasions. Instead of an Axial 
“age,” we should speak of axiality and axialization in the sense we speak 
of globalism and globalization, as a tendency that appears under different 
conditions in different “ages” of human history. Civilizations with a title to 
qualify as “Axial” should show significant forms of emancipation from tra­
dition and primary world-embeddedness, and a pronounced tendency to 
formulate ideas or norms with a claim to universal validity. They should be 
able to produce a canon of texts enshrining these ideas and norms as well as 
institutions of learning and exegesis that keep their normative and forma­
tive impact alive until today. A given civilization arrives at the stage of axi­
ality if these conditions are fulfilled.
It would be highly desirable to distinguish, within or below the two gen­
eral categories of distanciation and universality, a certain number of “Axial 
features” such as reflexivity, individuality, interiority (“inner man”), progress 
in abstraction and intellectuality, theory, critique of tradition, differentia­
tion, transcendental concepts or visions, and so on, and to arrive at a consen­
sus concerning their definition. It is not necessary that all of them be present 
in a given civilization at a given epoch. Axiality, in my view, should not be 
conceived of as a Platonic idea66 that finds its expression in more or less per­
fection in the course of history, but rather in terms of “family resemblance” 
in the sense of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Family resemblance connects a set of 
items and a set of properties in the way that all items share some properties 
with some (not all) other items. Time (occurrence around 500 bce ± 300) has 
to be ruled out as a significant property. Literacy in the form of cultural, not 
sectorial, literacy and perhaps even secondary canonization, together with a 
culture of exegesis as its necessary complement, are probably to be recog­
nized as indispensable prerequisites for most of the “Axial features.”
Another question is how to deal with precursors such as ancient Egypt 
and ancient Mesopotamia. Generalizing from ancient Egypt, my impression
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is that we should allow for proto-axiality in the sense of intermediate stages 
between non-axiality and full axiality in the same way as we distinguish 
prewriting from both pure orality and literacy proper. Among the proto- 
Axial features in ancient Egypt, I would include the idea of an individual 
judgment after death with its concepts of individuality and moral responsi­
bility, a rather strong concept of “inner man” in connection both with the 
judgment of the dead and the rise of “personal piety,” a radical rejection of 
tradition in the context of King Akhenaten and his religious revolution, 
and, in the aftermath of this revolution, the development of strong concepts 
of divine transcendence. With regard to Mesopotamia, we may point to 
considerable steps toward canonization and a rich tradition of commentar­
ies, to the level of theorizing in the fields of astronomy and mathematics, the 
astounding depth of certain literary texts (especially the Epic of Gilgamesh) 
and the beginnings of historiography. It should also be possible to discern 
specific “Axial moments” within the history of these and other civilizations 
that were obviously not numerous or strong enough to bring about the fa­
mous “breakthrough” into something that lasts until this day and has there­
fore a title to count as a root of modernity. It would also be important to 
account for this failure. Were there no “transcendental visions” in Mesopo­
tamia and Egypt or were there no means of institutionalizing them?
As historians, we have to be careful not to characterize a civilization ex­
clusively by the absence of features that we classify as “Axial” because they 
belong to our understanding of modernity, and to reconstruct the way that 
led from past to present civilizations exclusively in terms of evolution. 
Antiquity is much more than the mere “not yet” of modernity. Much has 
doubtlessly been lost along this way and much has been rediscovered that 
in reemerging from oblivion changed our world no less than real inven­
tions and innovations. This is, however, only the historian’s point of view, 
which is by no means the only one possible with regard to the past. It is 
equally important to look at the past not only for its own sake but also for 
the sake of the present and the future in order to get a clearer idea of where 
we come from and “whither we are tending.” The idea of the Axial Age is 
not so much about “man as we know him” and his/her first appearance in 
time, but about “man as we want him” and the utopian goal of a universal 
civilized community.
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